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Abstract
Since the entry into force of the European Union (“EU”) merger regulation in September
1990, there has been progress toward the acceptance of the need for rigorous economic analysis
as the basis for the application of Community competition law. Although the path toward sound
economic analysis has been uneven and recognition of the principle has sometimes exceeded its
correct application, the increased willingness to acknowledge economic analysis as the basis for
rational enforcement action should not be underestimated. The most noticeable and obvious suc-
cess has been in the field of merger control. But even a statute as venerable as Article 81, whose
early interpretation can be traced to a tradition of political economy (ordoliberalism) unrelated to
economic analysis, has been subjected to far-reaching reinterpretation, most notably by the Euro-
pean Courts. The result has been a relaxation of the strict application of the formalistic approach
to Article 81(1) according to which any restriction on the individual freedom of action of an eco-
nomic operator must be equated with a restriction on competition.
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Since the entry into force of the European Union ("EU")
merger regulation in September 1990, there has been progress
toward the acceptance of the need for rigorous economic analy-
sis as the basis for the application of Community competition
law. Although the path toward sound economic analysis has
been uneven and recognition of the principle has sometimes ex-
ceeded its correct application, the increased willingness to ac-
knowledge economic analysis as the basis for rational enforce-
ment action should not be underestimated. The most noticea-
ble and obvious success has been in the field of merger control.
But even a statute as venerable as Article 81, whose early inter-
pretation can be traced to a tradition of political economy
(ordoliberalism)l unrelated to economic analysis, has been sub-
jected to far-reaching reinterpretation, most notably by the Eu-
ropean Courts. The result has been a relaxation of the strict ap-
plication of the formalistic approach to Article 81(1) according
to which any restriction on the individual freedom of action of
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1. Ordoliberalism is a social/political philosophy extended to competition law pol-
icy. Its four characteristics have been defined as
(a) [a] competition policy primarily oriented to the goal of securing indi-
vidual freedom of action [as a value in itself], from which the goal of eco-
nomic efficiency is merely derived;
(b) a strong role for the [S] tate in the preservation of the prerequisites of
the competitive system but a distinct reserve towards intervention by the gov-
ernment in free market prices;
(c) the shaping of competition policy into a rule of law rather than a
mechanism for discretionary decisions; and
(d) the embedding of competition policy into the economic order of a
free and open society .... "
Wernhard Moschel, Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View, in GERMAN NEo-LIBER-
ALS AND THE SOCAL MARKET ECONOMY 142 (Alan T. Peacock & Hans Willgerodt eds.,
1989). Ordoliberal thinkers heavily influenced the drafting of the competition law sec-
tions of the Treaty of Rome and the protection of the individual's freedom of action as
a value in itself has played an important role in the interpretation of Articles 81 and 82
of the European Union ("EU") Treaty and continues to play a major role in German
competition law.
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an economic operator must be equated with a restriction on
competition.
Despite this progress, Article 82 appears in many respects to
have remained subject to the strictures of ordoliberalism and
thus has too often been based on an approach that has ignored
the need for sound economic analysis. There is express lan-
guage in Manufacture ftanfaise des pneumatiques Michelin v. Com-
mission ("Michelin II")2 that appears to require the Court to en-
gage in a serious economic assessment of allegedly abusive dis-
counting practices.3 However, such an approach was not
rigorously applied in that case nor in British Airways v. Commis-
2. Case T-203/01, [2003] E.C.R. 4071, 60, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 923, 951, 60
[hereinafter Michelin II].
3. See British Airways plc v. Commission, Case T-219/99, [2003] E.C.R. -, 247,
[2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1008, 1051-52, [hereinafter British Airways]; Michelin II, [2003] E.C.R.
4071, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 923. Both Michelin II, and British Airways indicate that the
Court's approach involves a two-step approach that seeks to determine, first, whether
there is an underlying cost justification for the discount scheme and, if there is not,
whether the discount scheme has anticompetitive effects. Both inquiries, if properly
carried out, require a serious economic assessment.
In determining whether a quantity rebate system is abusive, it will therefore be
necessary to... investigate whether, in providing an advantage not based on
any economic service justifying it, the rebates tend to remove or restrict the
buyer's freedom to choose his sources of supply, to bar competitors from ac-
cess to the market, to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties or to strengthen the dominant position by distorting
competition.
Michelin II, [2003] E.C.R. 60, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1051-52. Citing this language, one
commentator has recently characterized the Court's approach in Michelin II as "half per
se, half rule of reason." David Spector, Presentation at the Second Annual Association
of Competition Economics Conference (Dec. 2-3, 2004) (on file with the Fordham Int.
L. J.). Reference to a per se rule is not wholly accurate in that there are no per se rules
under Article 82. In both Michelin II and British Airways the Court refers to effects, a
concept that would not be relevant in a true per se analysis. In particular, as Paragraph
60 makes clear, Michelin I identifies two areas for economic and factual inquiry: (i)
whether there is an economic justification for the rebate; and (ii) if not, whether the
rebate has anticompetitive effects. See Michelin II, [2003] E.C.R. 60, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R.
at 1051-52. While there has been a tendency on the part of the Court to curtail the
second analysis once it determines that there is no economic justification for the rebate
under the first test, there is no legal requirement that it do so. The failure to conduct
such an analysis is inconsistent with both the legal test set forth in Michelin II and the
Court's case law which gives foreclosure effects a serious examination. See Van den
Bergh Foods v. Commission, Case T - 65/98, (CFI Oct. 23, 2003) (not yet reported),
available at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=Submit&all
docs=Alldocs&docj=Docj&docop=Docop&docor=Docor&docjo=Docjo&numaff=&
datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=Vantenergh&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100.
sion.4 Rather, these and other rebate cases tend to overlook de-
mand-side and efficiency considerations when assessing discount
schemes5 and to condemn, without detailed economic analysis,
rebates that are deemed to induced loyalty6 and are found not to
be cost based. Unfortunately, such an approach strengthens the
impression that Article 82 remains a Community problem child
whose growth to maturity has been delayed by its adherence to
an analytic tradition too far removed from economic principles
and methods.
The recent confirmation and, apparent extension of the
strict treatment of non-cost-based, fidelity-inducing discount sys-
tems in Michelin 11' and British Airways' is surprising when con-
trasted with the more rigorous factual and economics-based
analysis that has been adopted in Article 82 cases relating to re-
fusals to deal and in cases like Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission,'
that deals with exclusive dealing arrangements.' 0 In contrast to
discounts, exclusive dealing arrangements and refusals to deal
4. See generally British Airways, [2003] E.C.R. _, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1008; Michelin II,
[2003] E.C.R. 4071, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 923.
5. See David Spector, Loyalty Rebates and Related Pricing Practices: Ven Should Compe-
tition Authorities Worry? in LECG GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY. ECONOMIC ISSUES AND
IMPACT 317 (David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla eds., 2004). Spector makes the "provoca-
tive" argument that the European Community case law applicable to above-cost dis-
counting can be described as "rooted in nineteenth-century economic theory which
relied on a cost-based theory of value - from Ricardo to Marx." Id. at 333. Spector's
criticism focuses on the lack of attention given by the European Courts to demand-side
justifications for discounting practices. See id. For example, by their nature, discounts
in British Airways would have difficulty satisfying a supply-side cost-based test since they
were designed to incentivize travel agents' performance.
6. In effect this approach emphasizes form - the identification and classification
of types of conduct that must be avoided by dominant firms - over economic analysis of
the actual effects of the conduct. For a convincing critique of the form-based approach
see John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, Speech to the 31st Conference of the Euro-
pean Association for Research in Industrial Economics 1, 12-13 (Sept. 3, 2004), available
at http://www.oft.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/948B9FAF-B83C-49F5-BOFA-B25214DE6199/
0/spe03O4.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
7. [2003] E.C.R. 4071, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 923.
8. [2003] E.C.R. -, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1008. The extension results from the appli-
cation of Article 82, in Michelin II, to standardized volume targets and the resultant
elimination of price discrimination as an element of the discounting abuse, as well as
the Court of First Instance's ("CFI's") conclusory approach to anticompetitive effects in
British Airways. See generally British Airways, [2003] E.C.R. _, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 1008;
Michelin II, [2003] E.C.R. 4071, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 923.
9. Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission, Case T - 65/98 (CFI Oct. 23, 2003) (not
yet reported).
10. See generally Van den Bergh Foods, Case T-65/98.
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are, by their very nature, exclusionary, at least in the very narrow
sense. Yet in those cases, the European Courts have insisted on
establishing exclusionary effects in the broader economic con-
text of the relevant market, thereby focusing on the effect on
competition and not merely on one competitor. Also, they have
sought to balance anticompetitive harm against factors justifying
the dominant firm's conduct. This approach strongly suggests
that such an analysis should also be applied to loyalty-inducing
discounts in order to assess both their exclusionary impact and
their overall effect on consumer welfare. And indeed, the legal
test enunciated in Michelin II supports this conclusion inasmuch
as it imposes tests relating to justification and effects. 1
The more rigorous approach in refusal to deal cases may
result from the fact that many, but not all, of the recent refusal
to deal cases have dealt with intellectual property ("IP") rights.
In these cases, where the considerations outweighing an obliga-
tion to deal have, in theory, if not always in the individual case, a
legislative and policy basis that requires primafacie respect. How-
ever, the counterweight of IP rights does not explain cases like
the European Court ofJustice's ("ECJ's") landmark judgment in
Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeit-
schriftenverlag GmbH & Co.,' 2 which involved no IP rights, and its
reliance in that case on the style of analysis employed in Radio
Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications (ITP)
v. Commission ("Magill") 3 which did. Indeed, the more rigorous
approach in refusal to deal cases may itself stem from the
ordoliberal tradition. That is, the European Courts may have re-
quired that the imposition of an obligation to deal must be
11. See, e.g., British Airways, [2003] E.C.R. 281-93, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1056-58;
Michelin II, [2003] E.C.R. 60, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 950. As has been pointed out in a
recent article on monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, establishment of
the existence of foreclosure is not the end, but rather the middle of the analysis. See
Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REv. 253, 336 (2003).
Elhauge's approach is valuable because it provides guidance to when exclusionary con-
duct should be legal, rather than merely ending the discussion with a determination as
to whether conduct is exclusionary. See also infra note 45 and accompanying text. The
unsatisfying nature of the Court's judgments in the Article 82 rebate cases may be trace-
able largely to the defendants' emphasis on the characterization of their rebates, their
failure to insist on foreclosure, and lack of a robust justification for demand-side and
efficiency enhancing effects. See infra text accompanying note 16.
12. Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112.
13. Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C 242/91P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R.
718 [hereinafter Magill].
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clearly established with reference to all the circumstances of the
case and by a serious analysis of the effects of the refusal14 be-
cause imposing an obligation to deal conflicts with the
ordoliberal desire to preserve commercial freedom. The ideol-
ogy motivating the Courts' approach is of less importance than
the fact that, in dealing with refusals to deal or, in the case of
Van den Bergh Foods, outright exclusivity, the Courts have given
more serious consideration to foreclosure effects than in rebate
cases.
I. ABSENCE OF RIGOROUS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The debate about the role of Article 82 as concerns above
cost pricing practices has been the subject of a recent, public
dialogue between Luc Gyselen,1" former Head of Unit DG Com-
14. This assessment does not appear to be invalidated either by the Commission's
decision in Microsoft nor by the order of the President of the CFI refusing to grant
interim measures. See Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 22 De-
cember 2004, Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, [2004] E.C.R. -, [2005] 4
C.M.L.R. 5. The Commission's decision is inevitably based on its assessment of the facts
- i.e., the likelihood of foreclosure, the possible extension of Microsoft's dominance to
other markets - rather than on a per se condemnation. See Commission Decision No.
COMP/C-3/37.792 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 24, 2004), 834, available at http://europa.eu.
int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf. As a result, the deci-
sion will presumably stand or fall on that assessment as concerns both Microsoft's re-
fusal to grant rivals access to its intellectual property ("IP"), and the tying of its media
player to its Windows operating system. As concerns the former, both Microsoft and
the Commission claim to follow the outlines of the Court's traditional analysis in refusal
to license cases as most recently articulated in IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v. NDC
Health GmbH & Co KG, with the exception that Microsoft has introduced new argu-
ments based on the value and nature of its IP rights. See Order of the President of the
Court of First Instance of 22 December 2004, Microsoft, [2004] E.C.R. 205, 218,
[2005] 4 C.M.L.R. 205, 218. Although in the part of the case dealing with tying the
Commission has sought to invoke the standard of proof recognized in Michelin II and
British Airways, the President's order states that
[t]he present case none the less raises the complex question whether, and if so
on what conditions, the Commission may rely on the probability that the mar-
ket will 'tip' as a ground for imposing a sanction in respect of tying practiced
by a dominant undertaking where that conduct is not by nature likely to re-
strict competition, should that be the case.
Id. 1 400. The President's order also acknowledges, consistent with the refusal to deal
cases, that Microsoft's tying conduct may be justified - in this case by the positive
effects associated with the increasing standardization of products. See id. 1 401. Simi-
larly, the President's refusal to grant interim measures goes only to the issue of the
urgency of the requested relief and not to its ultimate appropriateness. The President
acknowledged that there is a prima facie case for relief. See id. 404.
15. See, e.g., Luc Gyselen, Rebates: Competition on the Merits or Exclusionary
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petition and John Kallaugher and Brian Sher.16 The contribu-
tion of all three authors is highly valuable: Mr. Gyselen's for the
clarity and rigor with which he has set forth and defended the
Commission's then-existing approach to loyalty-inducing price
abuses, and that of Messrs. Kallaugher and Sher for putting the
discussion about the absence of, and the need for, serious eco-
nomic analysis in Article 82 pricing cases in its historical context,
thereby illuminating a formalistic structural analysis that in the
past has often informed the approach in Article 82 rebate cases.
II. THE ORDOLIBERAL APPROACH
A recent defense of the ordoliberal and neo-classical ap-
proaches to the concept of competition has been provided by
Professor Giorgio Monti, who defines the aim of competition
policy under the ordoliberalism as "the protection of individual
economic freedom of action as a value in itself. 1 7
In his article, Professor Monti argues that "competition is a
process whereby market actors participate in the economy with-
out overwhelming constraints from private and public power.
Accordingly, the aim of competition policy is 'the protection of
individual economic freedom of action as a value in itself
.... "18 According to this view, "economic efficiency is the re-
sult of the freedom which competition law preserves. . .
[O]rdoliberalism values individual freedom as an end in it-
self. .. A restriction of competition within the meaning of
Article 81 (1) is "a restriction on freedom of the market partici-
Practice?, Presentation at the 8th EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop (June
2003).
16. See, e.g., John Kallaugher & Brian Sher, Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects
and Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82, 25 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 263 (2004). Kal-
laugher and Sher correctly identify, as the "traditional" approach, the Courts' limitation
of the ordoliberal concept of Leistungwettbewerb - performance-based competition
- to supply-side factors (the suppliers' cost savings that may justify a discount) and the
resulting exclusion of justifications based on demand-side factors identified in their
article and by Spector. See Spector, supra note 5, at 322. Whatever its traditional appli-
cation may have been, the term "performance-based competition" is broad enough to
encompass demand-side factors. Kallaugher & Sher imply as much and more when,
citing Van den Bergh Foods, they note "the ability of the Courts' to reach rather different
conclusions when problems are presented differently." Id. at 272.
17. See Giorgio Monti, Article 81 EC and Public Policy, 39 COMMON MKT. L. Rv.
1057, 1059-60 (2002) (citing M6schel, supra note 1, at 146).
18. Id. at 1059.
19. Id. at 1060.
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pants. 2 °
It is clear from the foregoing that the basic tenets of
ordoliberal doctrine do not cite to, nor rely on, any empirical
economic evidence or micro-economic theory. Instead, they ap-
pear to be based on a philosophy of political or social economy.
Nor does ordoliberalism embrace the twin goals of consumer
welfare and efficiency that are widely accepted as the prevailing
competition law standards.
There may be little doubt that there is much in the Court's
jurisprudence to support the equation of restrictions on free-
dom with restrictions of competition, particularly in the earlier
days of Article 81 (1) jurisprudence 2 ' and even today with respect
to Article 82.22 However, the Courts' more recent rejection of
the automatic equation of restrictions on commercial freedom
with restrictions on competition 23 and its increased insistence on
20. Id. at 1061. Historically, ordoliberalism can be viewed as response to the ex-
cess concentration of economic power. This reaction manifests itself as concern for
preserving what are perceived as "competitive" market structures and a lack of confi-
dence in the ability of markets to self-regulate. The result is often an over-willingness to
intervene in order to save competition from itself, or competitors from their more suc-
cessful rivals.
21. See, e.g., Etablissments Consten S.a.R.L. & GrundigVerkaufs-GmbH v. Commis-
sion, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299; [1966] C.M.L.R. 418; Compagnie
Royale Asturienne des Mines SA & Rheinzink GmbH v. Commission,Joined Cases 29 &
30/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1679; [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 688; Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici SpA v.
Commission, Case C-277/87, [1990] E.C.R. 45. SeeJavico Int'l &Javico AG v. Yves Saint
Laurent Parfums SA (YSLP), Case C-306/1996, [1998], E.C.R. 1-1983, 9 13.
As far as agreements intended to apply within the Community are concerned,
the Court has already held that an agreement intended to deprive a reseller of
his commercial freedom to choose his customers by requiring him to sell only
to customers established in the contractual territory is restrictive of competi-
tion within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
Id. (citing Hasselblad v. Commission, Case 86/82, [1984] E.C.R. 1-883, 908, 46, [1984] 1
C.M.L.R. 559, 592; and Bayerische Motorenwerke AG v. ALD Autoleasing D GmbH,
Case C-70/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3439, 3449, 1 19, 21, [1999] 5 C.M.L.R. 478, 489-90).
22. See, e.g., NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case
322/81, [1983] E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282 [hereinafter Michelin 1]; BPB Indus-
tries plc & British Gypsum Ltd. v. Commission, Case C-310/93P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-865, 4
C.M.L.R. 238; United Brands v. Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207; Irish
Sugar, plc v. Commission, Case T-228/97, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2969, [1999] 5 C.M.L.R.
1300.
23. See, e.g., Nungesser. v. Commission, Case 258/78, [1982] E.C.R. 2015; Coditel
SA, Compagnie Gdn~rale pour la Diffusion de la T6lvision v. Cin&Vog Films SA, Case
262/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3381, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 49; Louis Erauw-Jacquery SPRL v. La
Hesbignonne SC, Case 27/87, [1988] E.C.R. 1919; Remia BV v. Commission, Case 42/
84, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 1; Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de
Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, Case 161/84, [1986] E.C.R. 353; Gottrup-Klim Grovvareforen-
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the need to assess Article 81(1) in the proper economic con-
text,24  call into doubt its continued acceptance of the
ordoliberal approach as a reliable guide to the application of
Article 81 (1) and should be equally applicable in the context of
Article 82.25
Kallaugher and Sher provide a cogent review of the applica-
tion of the ordoliberal approach in the context of Article 82,
most notably in the Court's judgments in Hoffman-La Roche &
Co. Ag v. Commission26 a NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie
Michelin v. Commission ("Michelin /,),27 although the analysis
could be applied equally to price discrimination cases. 28 Review
ing v. Dansk Landbrugs Growareselskab AmbA (DLG), Case C-250/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-
5641, [1996] 4 C.M.L.R. 191. In Gottrup-Klim, the Court faced the task of clarifying the
status of rules of a purchasers' cooperative that restrained the commercial freedom of
the members of a cooperative by prohibiting them from purchasing outside the cooper-
ative under then Article 85(1). See Gottrup-Klim Grovvareforening, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5686,
28, [1996] 4 C.M.L.R. at 226. The Court had little difficulty concluding that the
restrictions in question fell outside the scope of Article 85(1) because they were inher-
ent in the nature of a purchasing cooperative. See id., [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5689-90, 45,
[1996] 4 C.M.L.R. at 228.
24. See European Night Services Ltd. & Others v. Commission, Joined Cases T-374,
375, 384 & 388/94, [1998] E.C.R. 11-3141, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. 718.
25. See generally Mario Monti, EU Competition Policy in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FoRDHAm CORPORATE LAw INSTITUTE 87 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2003). The ordoliberal
insistence on the protection of individual economic freedom of action as a value in
itself also appears inconsistent with the Commission's recent acceptance of consumer
welfare as the cornerstone for its application of the competition rules. Then Commis-
sioner Mario Monti: the Commission's "ultimate goal is the promotion of economic
performance and the protection of consumer welfare." Id. at 88. See M6schel, supra
note 1, at 146-49.
26. Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, [979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211.
27. [1983] E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282.
28. The application of ordoliberal prejudices to price discrimination is doubly un-
fortunate since price discrimination may occur in the absence of market power and
may also enhance output. See Einer Elhauge,Wy Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out En-
trants are Not Predatory - and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE
L.J. 681, 738-41 (2003): Elhauge argues that airline conduct, deemed predatory by reg-
ulatory authorities, can be explained by hub-and-spoke economics that make it more
efficient for one airline to provide both the nonstop and connecting flights. See id. at
751-52. According to Elhauge, given these economics, "reactive above-cost price cuts by
hub incumbents, exit by the single route entrant and restoration of higher prices can
be explained by fully desirable, competitive behaviour." Id. at 752. By its terms, Article
82 includes as an element of abusive price discrimination that the victim of the abuse
be placed at a "competitive disadvantage." See Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC
Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7 1992, O.J. C
224/1 (1992) 1 C.M.L.R. 719. The Treaty on European Union amended the Treaty
establishing the Europena Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298, U.N.T.S. 11, as
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of these judgments, the authors suggest, reveals that the Court
has adopted the two tests proposed by ordoliberal theorists for
determining the existence of an abuse (i) the reduction of com-
petitive opportunities of the dominant firm's rivals; and (ii) the
existence of conduct characterized as "non-performance-based"
competition.2' The adoption of these tests is reflected in the
Court's identification of the two constitutive elements of abuse
in Michelin I: conduct that (i) has the effect of reducing compe-
tition or preventing the emergence of new competition; and (ii)
is based on or employs "means other than normal competition
on the basis of the performance of commercial operators."3 ° In
practice, adoption of these tests can lead to a purely structural
analysis under which conduct by allegedly dominant firms is con-
amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741. The
Treaty establishing the European Community was amended by the treaty of Amsterdam
amending the Treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European Com-
munities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997). These amend-
ments were incorporated in the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty were re-
numbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity, O.J. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79, incorporating changes made by Treaty of
Amsterdam at art. 82. There is general agreement among commentators, however, that
neither the Community Courts nor the Commission have taken seriously the need to
establish such effects. See Carles Estva Mosso & Stephen Ryan, Article 82 - Abuse of a
Dominant Position, in THE EC LAw OF COMPETITION 117, 176 (Jonathan Faull & Ali
Nikpay eds., 1999) (citing United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. 207, and Hoffmann-LaRoche,
[1979] E.C.R. 461, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211); see also Ivo Van Bael &Jean Franqois Bellis,
COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 917 (2005) (citing Corsica Ferries Italia
Srl v. Corpo dei Piloti de Porto di Genova, Case C-18/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-1783, 1825, 43
and Irish Sugar plc v. Commission, Case T-288/97, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2969, [1999] 5
C.M.L.R. 1300; on appeal, Irish Sugar plc v. Commission, [2001] E.C.R. 1-5333, [2001] 5
C.M.L.R. 29); Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 395, 400-01, 403-05 (1987).
29. See Kallaugher & Sher, supra note 16, at 269.
30. According to Kallaugher and Sher, this test was actually first developed by Pro-
fessor Peter Ulmer of Heidelberg University in the mid 1970s. See id. Where the first leg
of the Ulmer/Hoffman-LaRoche test would require quantification and economic evi-
dence measuring anti-competitive effects, the second part of the test appears to be little
more than a form of words that can be applied after the fact to label conduct illegal. A
key concern of the first test is the extent to which it should be applied to condemn all
or only certain exclusionary conduct. A rigorous analysis that does not label all exclu-
sionary conduct abusive is less likely to be favored where 1) the competition rules are
interpreted or applied on the basis of structural assumptions and/or 2) where there is a
commitment to protecting competitors or the "competitive process," i.e., maintaining a
plurality of market actors without regard to their relative efficiency. As discussed below,
the refusal-to-deal cases, nearly all of which are horizontal, appear to reject such an
approach and instead indicate that not all exclusionary conduct is necessarily abusive.
A fortiori, there is no reason why this should not also be the case in discounting cases
inasmuch as such cases are vertical.
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demned without a sufficiently rigorous economic assessment of
either its foreclosure effects or the efficiencies that might justify
the conductA1
III. THE ORDOLIBERAL APPROACH REAFFIRMED -
MICHELIN II AND BRITISH AIRWAYS
Two recent pricing cases have confirmed and, at first
glance, apparently extended the application of the ordoliberal
approach to loyalty inducing discounts that are not cost-based.
In Michelin II,32 the Court of First Instance (the "CFI") departed
from its traditional distinction between quantity rebates (i.e., re-
bates that are calculated on the basis of the volume purchased)
and loyalty or fidelity rebates (rebates that are granted in ex-
change for an undertaking by the customer to purchase exclu-
sively or almost exclusively from the supplier). Similarly the CFI
broadened the condemnation of allegedly exclusionary discount
systems by (i) concluding a system of quantity rebates was abu-
sive even in the absence of price discrimination and (ii) taking
the view, that, for the purposes of finding an infringement of
Article 82, it is sufficient to show that the conduct of a company
in a dominant position tends to restrict competition, i.e., that is
capable of having such an effect. 33 In essence, once the discount
system is found to induce loyalty and lack a cost-based justifica-
tion, the Michelin II test tends to focus on the object of the con-
duct under review 4 in a manner reminiscent of the object test
under Article 81 (1).35 However, whereas such an approach may
31. See Kallaugher & Sher, supra note 16, at 271.
32. See generally Michelin II, Case T-203/01, [2003] E.C.R. 4071, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R.
923.
33. See id., [2003] E.C.R. 239, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 989, 239.
34. See id., [2003] E.C.R. 241, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 989, 241.
35. See cases cited supra, note 21, and accompanying text. Such an approach is
unhelpful in many ways. First, there is a risk that the "object" test may be equated with
"intent." Because the intent to succeed competitively inevitably involves prevailing over
one's competitors, its existence does not tell us anything valuable about the conduct in
question. Second, even if this confusion is avoided, an "object" test is used in Commu-
nity law to eliminate or sharply reduce the need to establish effects in any meaningful
way by presuming their existence from the type of conduct in question. However, there
is no unambiguous a priori way of determining whether any given course of conduct will
harm consumers based on the dominant firm's intentions or the nature of the conduct
itself. For this reason, an object only test or a test based on the presence of an intent to
eliminate or harm a competitor does not provide a sufficient basis for a finding of
abuse. The European Courts and the Commission have generally not grappled suffi-
ciently with this problem. One notable exception is Volvo v. Veng in which the Court
ARTICLE 82
be justified by the express reference in Article 81 to the "object
or effect," of a restrictive agreement, there is no textual basis for
such an approach under Article 82 which is why the case law
requires an analysis of effects. 36 The CFI's judgment in British
AirwayS3 7 illustrates some uncertainty about how rigorous such
an effects analysis must be. In that case the CFI observed that it
is not necessary to demonstrate that an abuse has had concrete
effects, it being sufficient to demonstrate that the conduct in
question "tends to restrict competition or in other words, that
the conduct is capable of having, or likely to have, such an ef-
fect. '38 "Tends to restrict," "likely to restrict," and "capable of
restricting" suggest at least two and possibly three potentially dif-
ferent tests. However, the Court supplements this rather impre-
cise approach by going on to note that 85% of air ticket sales in
the United Kingdom were carried out through travel agents 9
and that the BA reward system was based on the extent to which
travel agents increased their sales of BA tickets. These two facts
could be relevant to a more detailed assessment of the actual
impact of BA discount system. The Court's reference to them
therefore suggests the need for such an inquiry.
postulated a test for assessing refusals to deal that at least in part was aimed at assessing
the impact of the conduct on consumers. See generally Volvo v. Veng, [1988] E.C.R.
6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122. It is instructive to compare the EU position to the posi-
tion advocated by the U.S. enforcement agencies. In a recent amicus curiae brief, the
Federal Trade Commission argued that conduct having a business justification should
not constitute monopolization under Section II of the Sherman Act, regardless of its
anticompetitive effects. See Brief for the United States & the Federal Trade Commission
as Amici Curiae, Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, No.
02-682, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). According to the brief, conduct is business-justified and
should thus legal under Section II if it would be profitable regardless of its exclusionary
effects. See id. at 322. Kallaugher and Sher criticize the reasoning of Michelin II and
British Airways because the Court does not place sufficient emphasis on the need to
establish actual foreclosure effects and neglects the possible benefits of the conduct due
to its exclusive focus on whether there is a cost-based justification. See Kallaugher &
Sher, supra note 16, at 263-65. Spector takes a similar view, focusing on the Court's
reluctance to consider demand-side factors in Michelin I. See Spector, supra note 5, at
322; see also Vickers, supra, note 6, at 12-18.
36. See British Airways v. Commission, Case T-219/99, [2003] E.C.R. -, 247,
[2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1051-52; see also Michelin II, [2003] E.C.R. 4071, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R.
923.
37. See generally British Airways, [2003] E.C.R. __, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1008.
38. Id., [2003] E.C.R. 1 293, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1058, 293.
39. See id., [2003] E.C.R. 295, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. at 1058, 295.
2005] 1167
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IV. REFUSALS TO DEAL - A BREATH OF FRESHER AIR?
In contrast to the approach adopted in pricing cases, the
European Courts have been willing to engage in a seemingly
more rigorous style of analysis when it comes to refusals to deal.
In particular, in these cases the Community courts have given
more thorough consideration to whether the refusal to deal
would have exclusionary effects and/or whether, given the rele-
vant circumstances, the refusal can be justified.4 ° These two tests
parallel those in Michelin II, but the difference from the discount
cases lies in a more rigorous assessment of whether the refusal is
justified and whether it will have serious foreclosure effects.
In the most important current refusal to deal case now
pending before the ECJ involving refusals to supply parallel trad-
ers with pharmaceutical products in Greece.41 Based on eight of
the leading cases, Advocate-General Francis Jacobs has provided
an extensive summary of the analytic approach that has been de-
veloped in the context of refusals to deal. The following discus-
sion summarizes the approach in these and other refusal to deal
cases.
A. Commercial Solvents
Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano & Commercial Solvents v. Com-
mission ("Commercial Solvents")4 2 involved a refusal to deal with a
pre-existing customer that competed with the dominant firm in
a downstream market, which the latter had just entered. The
40. To the extent that it permits a defense of meeting competition, the Court has
also provided some scope for a justification defense in the context of discriminatory
pricing. See BPB Industries plc & British Gypsum Ltd v. Commission, Case T-65/89,
[1993] E.C.R. 11-0389, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 32; see also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES, XXVITH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 64 (1996).
41. See Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias
& Akarnanias (Syfait) & Others v. Glaxosmithkline AEVE, Case C-53/03, [2004] E.C.R.
- [hereinafter Syfait]. The Advocate-General, applying a detailed economic analysis of
price regulation in the pharmaceutical industry, has recommended that the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") rule that it is not an abuse to refuse to supply prescription
medicines to parallel traders. The case is of particular importance since the refusal to
deal would presumably eliminate competition from the parallel traders. The Advocate-
General has noted, however, that there is serious question as to whether, given the
dynamics of the pharmaceutical industry and the price regulation regimes adopted by
different member States' health authorities, such competition has any beneficial con-
sumer welfare effects. See id. 1 96-98.
42. Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223 [hereinafter Commercial Solvents].
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refusal was held to be abusive by the Commission.43 The Court
upheld the Commission's finding but in doing so stated that an
obligation to deal could only be imposed where the refusal to
supply would eliminate all competition in the downstream mar-
ket." For the purposes of this review, the Court's analysis is
noteworthy in that it can be read as requiring that there be an
absolute exclusionary effect, i.e., that the conduct result in the
creation of a monopoly in the downstream market. On another
level, the judgment may beg more questions than it answers
since it does not given any consideration to efficiencies.45
B. United Brands
In this case the Commission had condemned a number of
practices as abusive, including discriminatory pricing and the
termination of an existing distributor because it had dealt with
the dominant firm's rival. In assessing the termination of the
43. See Commission Decision No. 72/457/CEE, O.J. L 299/51 (1972) (ZOJA/CSC
- ICI), at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/Notice.do?mode=DBl&lngl=EN,fr&lang
&lng2=DA,de,el,en,es,fr,it, nl,pt,&val=27569:cs&page=I (last visited May 4, 2005).
44. See Commercial Solvents, [1974] E.C.R. at 223.
45. See Elhauge, supra note 11. According to Elhauge, the proper monopolization
standard should focus on whether the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in further-
ing monopoly power (i) only if the monopolist has improved its own efficiency or (ii)
by impairing rival efficiency whether or not it enhances monopolist efficiency. See id. at
256. Where the defendant has improved its own efficiency in order to make a better or
cheaper product, it should be free, according to Elhauge, to sell that product at any
above-cost price it wants, even though that may shrink rival market share to a size that
leaves rivals less efficient. The key is that this conduct can successfully impair rival
efficiency only as a by-product of the defendant improving its own efficiency, which
enhances the market options available to consumers. Similarly, when a defendant has
increased its own efficiency by investing in its intellectual or physical property, a refusal
to share that property with rivals should generally be legal because it rewards the im-
provement in the defendant's efficiency in a way necessary to maintain ex ante incen-
tives for investment." Id. Under this approach conduct that is a by-product of increas-
ing the dominant firm's efficiency would not be condemned. On the other hand,
Elhauge would condemn discriminatory refusals to deal with parties that deal with the
monopolist's rivals and conduct that would successfully enhance monopoly power by
impairing the efficiency of rivals, whether or not it enhanced the monopolist's effi-
ciency. Evaluation of Elhauge's views is, unfortunately, far beyond the scope of the
article. However, Elhauge has made a valuable contribution to the on-going debate
over the proper analytic approach to Section 2 and Article 82 by pointing out the ex-
tent to which authors, competition authorities, and courts use the term "exclusionary
conduct" in a purely conclusory manner and by focusing the discussion on efficiencies
as the appropriate point of analytic entry. Elhauge's article also provides a useful
benchmark for the distance that needs to be covered to bring the EU side of this discus-
sion into the appropriate analytic framework.
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existing distributor, the Court took into account the relevant
facts surrounding the refusal to deal including the fact that the
distributor was a longstanding customer whose orders were not
out of the ordinary and that the refusal to deal appeared to be
based only on the latter's decision to carry and promote a com-
peting brand. The Court did note, however, that a dominant
undertaking would be entitled to take reasonable steps appropri-
ate to protect its commercial interests, a theme that is repeated
in subsequent cases.4 6
C. Benzine en Petroleum
In Benzine en Petroleum Handelsmaatschappij BV & Others v.
Commission4 7 the Commission had treated as an abuse Benzine
Petroleum's decision not to supply an existing customer during
the 1973 and 1974 oil crisis.4 The Court annulled the Commis-
sion's decision on the grounds that the customer was only a spot
purchaser whom Benzine Petroleum ("BP") could not be ex-
pected to treat the same way,as its regular contractual customers.
The Court also noted that the spot customer was able to over-
come the oil crisis without suffering any obvious, immediate and
substantial competitive disadvantage or facing elimination. This
aspect of the judgment, however, appears to be secondary to the
finding that the refusal to deal was justified by the need to grant
preference to BP's regular, contractual customers during a pe-
riod of shortage.
D. Telemarketing
In a reference from a Belgian national court, the Court, re-
lying on Commercial Solvents, held that a refusal by the dominant
television broadcasting channel to permit third parties to pro-
vide telemarketing services would constitute an abuse if, without
any objective necessity, a dominant company reserved a market
for itself with the possibility of eliminating competition from
46. See Commission Decision No. 87/500/EEC, Case 32.279, O.J. L 286/36 (BBI/
Boosey & Hawkes) (1987) (requiring a dominant firm to supply a distributor that had
integrated into the upstream market, but noting that such obligation would not apply,
inter alia, if the distributor promoted the dominant firm's products as a loss leader).
47. Case 77/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1513, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 174.
48. See Commission Decision No. 77/327/EEC, O.J. L 117/1 (1977) (ABG/Oil
companies in the Netherlands).
other parties.49 As stated, the test would appear to be cumulative
with an abuse being deemed to exist only where there were both
no objective justification for the refusal to deal and exclusionary
effects.
E. Volvo. v. Veng
Volvo v. Veng 5 involved a reference from a national court in
the context of a dispute relating to design copyrights and thus
differs from the previously cited cases in that it involved IP
rights.5' The Court stated that a refusal to grant a license for the
design copyrights in question could not constitute an abuse in
itself, and that the exercise of such exclusive right would amount
to an abuse only where the dominant company (i) arbitrarily re-
fused to supply spare parts to independent repairers; (ii) set
prices for spare parts at an unfair level; or (iii) ceased to pro-
duce spare parts for a particular model still in circulation. 52 It
appears that the three criteria are distinct and not cumulative,
and that each of the three bases for establishing the existence of
an abuse would have the direct effect of permitting the domi-
nant firm to charge higher prices. Of the three abuses, the first
two arguably come within the "scope" of the IP right while only
the third - non-exploitation - could be condemned under IP
law principles which authorize the granting of licenses of right
where the right holder fails to exploit its invention. To the ex-
tent it focused on the impact on consumers, however, the ECJ
went beyond the level of generalities such as "performance-
49. See Centre belge d'6tudes du march6 - T6lmarketing (CBEM) SA. v. Compa-
gnie luxembourgeoise de t~l~diffusion SA & Information publicit6 Benelux SA, Case
311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261.
50. Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122.
51. The design copyright in question in force in England applied to automotive
spare parts and to the design of these parts even though there was no originality in-
volved. Some authors have taken the view that the IP rights in cases like Volvo, Magill,
infra pt. IV.F, and IMS, infra pt. IV.H, were "weak" and that this factor underlies the
Courts' approach, the implication being that circumstances would have to be "more"
exceptional in order to require access in a case involving a patent. See, e.g., Ian For-
rester, EC Competition Law as a Limitation on the Use of IP Rights in Europe: Is There a
Reason to Panic? (2003), at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Publications/ (last visited May 11,
2005). Some support for this view can be inferred from the Commission's rejection of
the complaint in cases involving patents and its willingness to act on the complaint in
IMS Health. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIVTH REPORT ON COM-
PETITION POLICY Annex II at 353 (1994).
52. See generally Volvo v. Veng, Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R.
2005] ARTICLE, 82 1171
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based competition" or "competition on the merits" by identify-
ing concrete practices that would arguably lead to higher prices
and consumer harm. The Court did not, however, appear to
consider whether the charging of higher prices would be justi-
fied in relation to the prices charged for the new vehicle and
thus did not engage in the type of analysis later advocated by the
Commission in cases relating to original equipment and con-
sumables.53
F. Magill
In its 1988 decision the Commission had held that three tel-
evision broadcasters had abused their dominant position by as-
serting the copyrights in their TV program schedules to prevent
the publisher of a weekly television program guide from listing
their programs in a situation in which no weekly television pro-
gram guide covering all three stations was available to the Irish
public.54 In its judgment the Court upheld the Commission's
decision.55 The Court concluded that a refusal to supply would
only constitute an abuse under "exceptional circumstances"56 in-
volving three conditions: (i) the product to which the refusal to
supply relates is an indispensable input required for the market-
ing of a new product; (ii) there is no justification for such re-
53. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 41-42, 86-87 (1996), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publi-
cations/ra9501en-en.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). The Commission departed from
the doctrine established in Hugin Kassaregister AB & Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v. Commis-
sion, that a supplier of original equipment holds a dominant position for its own spare
parts. See Hugin Kassaregister AB & Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v. Commission, Case 22/
78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345. In the XXVth Annual Report on Competi-
tion Policy, the Commission stated that a supplier of original equipment should not be
deemed to hold a dominant position for its consumables where (i) there was effective
competition in the market for the original equipment; (ii) purchasers of the original
equipment were well informed about the pricing of consumables; and (iii) the relation-
ship between the capital cost of the original equipment and cost of consumables was
such that buyers would readily switch to another supplier of original equipment if
faced with an increase in the price of consumables. See XXVTH ANNUAL REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY, supra, at 41-42, 87 (1995).
54. See Commission Decision No. 89/205/EEC, OJ. L 78/43 (1989) (Magill).
55. See Magill, Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, [1995] 4
C.M.L.R. 718, 799-800.
56. The "exceptional circumstances" test appears to be an attempt to balance the
conflicting claims of the statutory monopoly granted under IP law with competition law
concerns about the exclusionary effects of the IP law monopoly right. An analysis of the
Article 82 jurisprudence, however, suggests that it may be no more than a variation of
the rule of reason analysis.
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fusal; and (iii) the dominant company reserves for itself the sec-
ondary downstream market.5 7 While there was some debate as
to whether the three conditions were intended to be cumulative,
the Court of Justice has subsequently confirmed that this is in-
deed the case. 58 The key element in the case appears to have
been the unjustified exclusion of a new, innovative product - a
comprehensive weekly television guide - for which there was
potential demand, for which the three broadcasters' copyrighted
program listings were an indispensable input and which none of
the three TV broadcasters was capable of providing itself. As
such, the Court's judgment gives specific content to the restric-
tion of competition involved by anchoring the latter in an out-
put restriction damaging consumers as a result of the unavaila-
bility of a novel product not provided by any of the three domi-
nant firms. 9
G. Oscar Bronner
Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeit-
schriftenverlag GmbH & Co.6" involved a reference from an Aus-
trian court in which plaintiff claimed that it required access to its
allegedly dominant rival's newspaper distribution network,
which was the only nationwide home delivery scheme in Austria
and which the dominant firm used to distribute its own newspa-
pers, in order to compete.6 1 In its response to the national
court's questions, the Court reiterated that a refusal to supply
would only constitute an abuse if such a refusal would eliminate
all competition." With reference to Magill, the Court further
noted that the refusal must not be objectively justified and that
the refused product or service must be indispensable for carry-
ing the customer's business without any actual or potential sub-
57. See id.
58. See IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG, Case 418/
01, [2004] E.C.R. -, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28; see also infra note 68 and accompanying text.
59. This result is in line with the test proposed by Elhauge. See supra note 11, and
accompanying text. It represents an easy case, however, in that there was no efficiency
gain for the three monopolists and a negative efficiency impact on their rival, who was
prevented from introducing an innovative product for which there was likely to be de-
mand.
60. Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112.
61. See id., [1998] E.C.R. 7, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 135, 7.
62. See id.
20051 1173
1174 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:1157
stitute.6" Bronner is an important case. First, the reference to
Magill suggests that the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine is
not limited to cases involving IP rights.64 Second, the Court re-
quired the plaintiff to show that there was no alternative to ac-
cess to the dominant firm's distribution network, thus giving
some teeth rather than paying mere lip service to the require-
ment that actual foreclosure be established.6 5 Third, by requir-
ing evidence that access was indispensable the Court established
reasonable constraints that reduce the risk of an uncontrolled
extension of the essential facilities doctrine.66
H. IMS Health
In its decision the Commission sought to extend the "excep-
tional circumstances" doctrine established in Magill by requiring
a compulsory licensing in a situation in which the relevant IP
rights were being exploited by the allegedly dominant firm and
the complainant was seeking to offer what was arguably a "me-
63. See id. [1998] E.C.R. 26, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 140, 26.
64. Prior to Microsoft, the European Courts have never had to address the applica-
tion of Article 82 in IP cases involving patents. Indeed, the IP rights in Volvo and Magill
can be characterized as "weak" or questionable rights. In one precedent involving a
research and development-intensive industry, the Commission took a clear position
against a right of access, though in this case, failure to exploit the patent was not at
issue. See XXIVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 51, at 353. The Euro-
pean Commission concluded that it was highly doubtful whether there was a duty for
dominant companies to license patent rights to competitors for the manufacture of the
same product as the patent holder manufactures itself - especially, in research and
development-intensive industries. In this case, Lederle had lodged a complaint to the
European Commission alleging that Paster Mrieux, Merck, and SKB were abusing
their dominant positions in various EC Member States by not supplying and licensing
the registration documents for Hepatitis B vaccine to Lederle for inclusion in a multiva-
lent vaccine being developed by Lederle. The Commission stated that it was highly
doubtful whether Article 82 imposed an obligation upon a dominant firm to share its IP
rights with third parties to allow them to develop, produce, and market the same prod-
ucts which the alleged dominant firm was also seeking to develop, produce, and mar-
ket, especially in sectors such as the vaccine sector where research and development
required high levels of investment. See id. The Commission further noted that even a
refusal to supply could not be considered as an abuse, as Lederle was not an existing
customer that had found itself in a situation of factual dependence for the supply of the
Hepatitis B vaccine.
65. Oscar Bronner, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791 45, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 145, 45.
66. For a critique of the overly-broad application of this doctrine, see generally
John J. Kallaugher & James S. Venit, Essential Facilities: A Comparative Law Approach, in
1994 FoRDHAM CORP. L. INST. 315 (Barry Hawk ed., 1995).
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too" product.6 7 This decision gave rise to four court cases - two
interim orders by the CFI, one by the ECJ, and a judgment by
the ECJ.6 8 These pronouncements were critical of the Commis-
sion's approach, confirming that the three conditions estab-
lished in Magill are cumulative and indicated that there would
be no obligation to license where the plaintiff merely sought to
offer a "me-too" product.
As noted by the Advocate-General in Synetairismos Farmako-
poion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) & Others v. Glaxosmithkline
AEVE, these cases would appear to establish the need for careful
analysis in refusal to deal cases.6 9 First, it is necessary to establish
that access to the input or facility of the allegedly dominant firm
is indispensable for the rival to compete (which in turn requires
a factual finding as to the likelihood of overall anticompetitive
effects in the event access is not granted).7 Second, in cases
involving an IP right it is also necessary either to establish that
there is an unsatisfied demand for the rival's product7 l or that
67. See Order of the President of the Court, IMS Health v Commission, Case T-
184/01 R, [2001] E.C.R. 11-3193, [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 1 (appeal dismissed).
68. The four cases were: (i) an interim ruling on IMS's appeal of the Commis-
sion's interim measures decision pursuant to which the Commission's interim measures
order was suspended until the final order on interim relief was issued by the CFI, Order
of the President of the Court of 10 August 2001, IMS Health Inc. v. Commission, Case T-
184/01 R, [2001] E.C.R. 11-2349; (ii) a final order of the President of the CFI sus-
pending the Commission's interim measures decision, Order of the President of the
Court of 26 October 2001, IMS Health lnc v. Commission, Case T-184/01 R, [2001 ] E.C.R.
11-03193; (iii) order of the ECJ rejecting the appeal brought by the complainant, Order
of the President of the Court of 11 April 2002, NDC Health, of the CFI's order sus-
pending interim measures, NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG & NDC Health Corp. v. Commis-
sion &IMS Health, Inc., Case C-481/01 P(R), [2002] E.C.R. 1-3401; (iv) and a reference
to the ECJ from a German court on litigation arising out of IMS attempts to get an
injunction from the German courts restraining NDC from using infringing its copy-
righted product, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG & NDC Health GMBH & Co. KG v. Com-
mission, Case C-418/01, [2004] E.C.R. _, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28.
69. The Advocate-General's review does not cover every Court or Commission pre-
cedent. One problematic precedent not discussed is Tierce Ladbroke SA v. Commission in
which the CFI may have extended Magill by finding that there may be a duty to license
either where access is essential or because the introduction of a new product might be
prevented. Similarly, the reference to the fact that no other licenses had been granted
for Belgium is disturbing because it could be read as suggesting (in application of the
rule against discrimination by dominant firms) that a dominant firm must license every-
body once it has licensed somebody. See Tierc6 Ladbroke SA v. Commission, Case T-
504/93, [1997] E.C.R. II 923, 969, 130-32, [1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 309, 333-34.
70. The Advocate-General's opinion cites the need to establish "some exceptional
harm to competition." Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Syfait, Case C-53/03,
[2004] E.C.R. _.
71. As noted above in the discussion of Volvo v. Veng, this may be a somewhat
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the IP owner will abuse its right to the detriment of consumers;
and (iii) the criteria for determining whether a refusal is abusive
are highly dependent on the specific facts of each case.
V. DOES ORDOLIBERALIJSM ALSO EXPLAIN THE APPROACH
TO REFUSALS TO DEAL?
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, there are no per se
rules under Article 82.72 Thus, there is no legal basis for the lack
of detailed economic analysis in assessing the justifications for,
and the effects of, pricing practices that induce loyalty nor for
the difference in the style of analysis in discounting cases and
those involving exclusivity or outright refusals to deal.
Against this background, the difference in approach be-
tween, the rebate cases, on the one hand, and the refusal to deal
and exclusivity cases, on the other, is both puzzling and indefen-
sible. The rebate cases are vertical and the effects of discounting
are far from self-evidently anticompetitive. Discount schemes
lower prices and thus have potential for consumer benefits whilst
discriminatory pricing may benefit consumers by increasing out-
put. Since it is not possible in either case to predict a priori that
the effect can only be anticompetitive, and since there are possi-
optimistic reading since two of the triggering factors of a duty to license identified in
Volvo were charging excessive prices and refusing to supply independent third parties.
SeeVolvo v. Veng, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, 6235, 9, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122, 135-36. This is
conduct that would appear to be inherent in an IP monopoly. However, it would ap-
pear that Magill overrules Volvo by basing the finding of abuse solely on an unjustified
refusal to satisfy potential demand thus aligning the competition law position more
closely with the classical IP position. See Magill, Joined Cases C-241 & 242/9IP, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-743, 824, 54-55, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718, 791. It should be noted that in
Magill, the Commission had sought to argue that the defendants had engaged in two of
the abusive forms of conduct the Court identified in Volvo: refusing to provide an input
to independent third parties and non-exploitation of IP rights. See id. The Court's re-
jection of the Commission's analysis in IMS in which the complainant sought to intro-
duce a non-innovative "me-too" product further strengthens the conclusion that the
restraint on innovation is the key to the Magill analysis.
72. In Case C-53/03, the Commission argued that a refusal to supply is always abu-
sive unless the dominant firm can identify an "appropriate and sufficiently substantial
objective justification" and supported this contention by relying on the allegedly anti-
competitive character of the conduct in question, i.e., the attempt to restrict intra-
brand competition from parallel imports. Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs, Syfait,
Case C-53/03, [2004] E.C.R. -, 49-50. The Advocate-General rejected this ap-
proach as inconsistent with the case law, arguing that "any obligation to deal pursuant
to Article 82 can be established only after a close scrutiny of the factual and economic
context." See id. 53. The language of Paragraph 53 mirrors that of Paragraph 60 of
Michelin I. See Michelin II, [2003] E.C.R. 4071, 1 60, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 923, 951, 60.
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ble efficiency benefits, such conduct does not appear to be well
suited to an approach based on the formal classification of the
rebate scheme. Conversely, the refusal to deal cases are for the
most part horizontal, and refusals to deal and exclusive dealing
are, by their nature, exclusionary at least as concerns the imme-
diate impact on the party to whom access is denied. Under these
circumstances, and accepting arguendo the prevailing premises
of Article 82 analysis, one would expect that refusals to deal,
rather than discounting practices, would be the more likely can-
didate for a more peremptory style of analysis. That this is not
the case requires some explanation.
One possible explanation could be that the Community in-
stitutions have recognized the need for greater reliance on de-
tailed factual and economic analysis and greater certainty as to
anticompetitive effects in the context of refusals to deal. This
may be because much of the case law has involved IP rights,
where the legislatively created monopoly right creates a prima
facie basis for legitimate exclusion and the requirement to grant
access must be viewed as an exception to the norm. On its face,
this explanation appears persuasive enough. However, it is not
consistent with non IP cases such as Bronner nor does it explain
exclusive dealing cases like Van den Bergh Foods.
Perversely, the apparent paradox may be the result of the
same fundamental ordoliberal concerns that infect the analysis
in Article 82 rebate cases. For the ordoliberal tradition, the im-
position of an obligation to deal represents a very serious incur-
sion on commercial freedom to which ordoliberal thought is res-
olutely and dogmatically opposed." Any such obligation will,
therefore, be heavily disfavored by ordoliberal theory. It is for
this reason that the ordoliberal approach is likely to require
compelling evidence of actual foreclosure and the absence of
any business justification in refusal to deal cases - precisely the
elements that characterize the Court's analysis in those cases.
Conversely, imposing restraints on the granting of discounts or
on discriminatory pricing may be perceived as involving less se-
vere or absolute restrictions on commercial freedom. This is
particularly the case of discriminatory pricing practices which
are readily labeled, by ordoliberals, as "unfair" and thus highly
undesirable when practiced by dominant firms. Whilst on its
73. See generally Monti, supra note 17.
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face the analysis may be less obvious in the area of discounting,
constraints imposed on the freedom of a dominant firm to dis-
count can fairly be said to be narrower than imposition of an
absolute obligation to deal since the limitation is imposed on
how one deals with a third party not whether one deals at all,
and the limitation effects only certain and not all pricing prac-
tices.
In the end, the counter-intuitive results of ordoliberal rea-
soning do not make the difference in approach between the re-
bate and refusal to deal cases/exclusivity any more sustainable.
Nor do they mean that the Commission and the Community and
national courts are precluded by Article 82 or the case law from
building on the more economically rational approach in the re-
fusal to deal and exclusivity cases. Rather, these contradictions
merely highlight the inability of the ordoliberal approach to
withstand analysis under competition law principles based on
consumer welfare and efficiency. That one arrives at this conclu-
sion as a result of the contradictions in the ordoliberal attitude
toward discounting and refusals to deal only serves as a piquant
reminder of the inadequacies of a social and political philosophy
that is poorly equipped to provide the economic analysis re-
quired for the sound application of Article 82.
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